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Comments
CIMmINAL PROCEDUIRE-CoNsTITUTIONAL LaMrrATIONS ON IMPOSITION OF
MoRE SEVERE SENTENCE AFTER CONVICTION UPON R1ETL.-Defendant
Pearce was convicted under North Carolina law for assault with at-
tempt to rape and sentenced to twelve to fifteen years in prison. This
conviction was reversed several years later by the North Carolina
Supreme Court because the prosecution's evidence included an in-
voluntary confession.' He was convicted upon retrial and given an
eight year sentence with credit for time served on the previous sen-
tence. The second sentence increased Pearce's prison time by almost
three years.2 No reason or justification for the more severe sentence
appeared in the record. Pearce, after futilely appealing to the North
Carolina Supreme Court,3 appealed the sentence to the United States
District Court by writ of habeas corpus. The district court, citing
Patton v. North Carolina,4 held that the harsher sentence was void and
unconstitutional. The state failed to resentence Pearce within sixty
days; therefore, the district court ordered his release. The order was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals 5 and certiorari was
granted.6 Held: Affirmed. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires that whenever a judge imposes a more severe
sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his de-
cisions must affirmatively appear. North Carolina v. Pearce 395 U.S.
711 (1969).7
The Court in its consideration of what constitutional limitations there
I State v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).
2 Pearce would have been released under the first sentence (with all allow-
ances for good behavior) on November 13, 1969. His release date under the
second sentence would be (with all allowances for good behavior) October 10,
1972. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 713, n. 1 (1969).
3 State v. Pearce 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966).
4 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967). This case held that a defendant may not be
resentenced to a longer term of imprisonment at his second trial than he received
at his first (where he pleaded nolo contendere) even though the first conviction
was vacated on constitutional grounds. The court's rationale was that a harsher
sentence would violate the due process, equal protection and double jeopardy
clauses of the Constitution.
As recently stated by a student writer:
The effect of the Patton decision is, thus to intensify the disagreement
which exists among the circuits on the harsher punishment issue. It ap-
pears certain that this conflict will be resolved only when the Supreme
Court has spoken on the issue. Note, Retrial of the Successful Criminal
Appellant: Harsher Punishment and Denial of Credit for Time Served,
28 MD. L. REv. 64 (1968).
5Pearce v. North Carolina, 397 F.2d 2,53 (4th Cir. 1968).
6North Carolina v. Pearce, 393 U.S. 922 (1968).
7 The Court's opinion written by Justice Stewart represents the view of only
four justices. Four others agreed only that Pearce should be released.
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may be upon the imposition of a more severe sentence after recon-
viction, had three alternatives from which to choose. Historically,
courts faced with this issue have either unqualifiedly upheld the
harsher sentence,8 absolutely overruled the harsher sentence,9 or
limited the power to impose such a sentence.' 0 An apparent majority
of courts have held or indicated that it is permissible to impose a
harsher sentence after a new trial."- Four arguments have been used
to justify increased sentences: (1) the possibility that a harsher sen-
tence could act as a deterrent to frivolous appeals; 12 (2) the need for
individualized sentencing based on the current case history of the
criminal appellant;13 (3) the tendency to discourage appellate review
of sentencing; 14 (4) the fact that the first trial is a nullity and by ap-
pealing, the defendant has waived the consequences of that trial.15
8 Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177
U.S. 155 (1900); King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938); United
States v. Sanders, 272 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Calif. 1967).
9 Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); Whalley v. North
Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); People v. Ali, 424 P.2d 932, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1967); People v. Henderson, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963);
State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966); State v. Turner, 429 P.2d 565
(Ore. 1967).
10United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967); Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1967); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
11 Annot 12 A.L.R.3d 987 (1967); accord, Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake:
Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 610
(1965); Comment, 25 WAsH. & LE L. REv. 60, 62 (1968).
12 The argument is that the possibility of harsher sentence upon retrial dis-
courages criminal defendants from making frivolous appeals. The courts otherwise
would be flooded with petitions for retrial from prisoners with nothing to lose
and everything to gain. Society's interest in better judicial administration and
interest of the defendant with a legitimate appeal are better protected if court
time is not wasted on such appeals. For a discussion of this view see Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 445 (1963) (dissenting opinion); People v. Henderson 886 P.2d
677, 691, 35 Cal. Reptr. 77,-, (1963) (dissenting opinion); see also Comment,
80 Hnv. L. REv. 891, 893 (1967).
13 This view assumes that the sentencing process at retrial is refined enough
to individually assess the years needed to punish and rehabilitate each defendant.
The resentencing judge, with the latest information, can take a "fresh look" at
the defendant which will, theoretically, give a truer picture of the defendant's
character at retrial. The state has an important interest in the imposition of a
sentence that appears just in light of the latest and best information. Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 843 (2d
Cir. 1968); Starner v. Russell 378 F.2d 808, 811 (3rd Cir. 1967)- Note, Retrial
of Successful Criminal Appellant: Harsher Punishment and Denial of Credit for
Time Served, 28 MD. L. R-v. 64 (1968). Also, most of the criminal convictions
are the result of guilty pleas and the original sentence in these cases is veryarbitrary.a r. [lIt is widely known that unduly lenient sentences may frequently
be imposed following a plea of guilty, or following some bargaining with
the prosecutor .... [T]he interests of society in exacting fair punishment
or effective rehabilitation may not have been properly vindicated through
the original sentence. Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 620.
14 Appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with the trial judge's sentencing
decision because they feel that he has been in the best position to determine the
(Continued on next page)
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The more recent decisions in the federal courts and the majority of
law review commentators absolutely deny the permissibility of a
harsher sentence.' 6 Some authorities base their objections on the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.17 Others cite the constitutional
grounds that to allow harsher sentences upon retrial puts the defen-
dant in double jeopardy'8 and/or denies him equal protection of the
laws' 9 and/or deprives him of due process of law.20
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
appropriate sentence. This should be especially true when federal courts are
reviewing the actions of state courts. It is argued that the appellate courts should
show faith and trust in the judicial discretion of the trial courts. Starner v. Russell,
378 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1967); Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855, 863 (N.D.
W. Va. 1967) rev'd per curiam, 391 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1967); Comment, 25
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 60, 63 (1968).
15 Simply stated the waiver theory holds that since the original conviction
has, at the defendant's behest, been reversed, all consequences of the first trial are
nullified and upon retrial the slate is wiped clean. The second sentence therefore
cannot be compared to the first because the defendant has waived the benefit of it
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957) (dissenting opinion); Stroud
v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808, 811 (3d
Cir. 1967); United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir. 1965); King
v. United States, 98 F.2d 291, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Note, Constitutional Law:
Increased Sentence and Denial of Credit under the Traditional Waiver Theory,
1965 DU=E L.J. 395 (1965); Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1967). A similar theory
is that the defendant assumes the risk of a harsher sentence upon retrial and
therefore he is precluded from double jeopardy protection. Trono v. United States,
199 U.S. 521 (1905); Bohannon v. District of Columbia, 99 A.2d 647 (Mun. Ct.
App. D.C. 1953); Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1967).
16 See note 18, infra.
17 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been stated as follows:
...[The] enjoyment of governmental benefits may not be conditioned
up on the waiver or relinquishment of constitutional rights, at least in the
absence of compelling societal interests which justify the subordination
of such rights under the circumstances. Van Aistyne, supra note 11, at
614.
The governmental benefits involved here are the right to appellate review and
access to laws which prohibit the changing of sentence within a statutory time
after it is imposed if the defendant does not appeal. The government should
not be able to withhold or revoke the benefit because the defendant refuses to
surrender his constitutional rights. The fact that the original conviction was ob-
tained through unconstitutional means should not mean that the defendant who
chooses to have the constitutional errors corrected will be denied the governmental
benefits. The proponents of the doctrine recognize only two sufficiently compelling
interests to justify any restrictions on the governmental benefits: (1) to insure
that the benefit is maintained for its intended purpose and protect its effective-
ness; and (2) the social interest must be protected against those whose capacity for
inflicting harm is increased by the possession of this benefit. See United States
v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428, 430 (4th Cir. 1965); Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at
614; Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAsv. L. tEv. 1595 (1960).
18... "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. This clause was made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Two arguments have been made in applying the double jeopardy clause to
the sentencing upon retrial. The first is that a defendant is impliedly acquitted
of any harsher penalty by the judge or jury's selection of the penalty at the first
trial. The second and more modern approach is that the double jeopardy clause
(Continued on next page)
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Some courts have not found the practice of increasing sentences
upon retrial absolutely barred by the Constitution, but they have re-
cognized that the practice was subject to abuse.21 These courts, in
order to protect the successful appellants from the possibility of being
punished for appealing, have stipulated that a resentencing judge
must have legitimate reasons for increasing the sentence upon retrial,
but they differ in the requirements and guidelines for the resentencing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
prohibits multiple punishments (any beyond the first sentence). The implied
acquittal theory is the antithesis of the waiver theory (discussed at note 15 supra).
Like the waiver theory it is a corollary of a more accepted axiom (that the de-
fendant is impliedly acquitted of any higher degree of an offense when the jury
finds him guilty of the lesser one). The multiple punishment argument is that the
double jeopardy clause prevents (1) reprosecution for the same offense fol-
lowing acquittal or (2) reprosecution tor the same offense or (3) multiple punish-
ment for the same offense. The multiple punishment application to harsher sen-
tencing upon reconviction is an extension of the double jeopardy prohibition
against arbitrarily increasing a sentence after service has begun. This argument
is not applied when sentences are increased to bring them up to the statutory
minimum. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.
19672; Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); People v.
Henderson, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301,
216 A.2d 586 (1966); Honigsberg, Limitations Upon Increasing a Defendants
Sentence Following a Successful Appeal and Reconviction, 4 CanM. L. BUrLL. 329
(1968); Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 630-36; Note, Retrial of the Successful
Criminal Appellant: Harsher Punishment and Denial of Credit for Time Served,
28 Mn. L. 1_Ev. 64 (1968); Comment, 80 HIav. L. 1Ev. 891 (1967); Comment,
32 ST. JoaNs L. PE~v. 324 (1958); Comment, 9 Vm. L. R v. 517 (1964); Com-
ment, 50 VA. L. 11Ev. 559 (1964); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 3d 978 (1967).
19"No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CON5T. amend. XIV § 1. The argument here is that
equal protection is denied because successful appellants are the only defendants
whose sentence could be increased. This is true because:
[I]t is currently the law in every jurisdiction that no sentence may in
fact be reopened for revision once the term of the trial court has ex-
pired, service of sentence has commenced, and the time for an appeal
by the state (where such is allowed) has elapsed .... Defendants who
passively remain in jail are assured at least that their sentences will not
be increased, . . . Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 615.
The successful appellants therefore are invidiously classified. The argument con-tinues with other examples of preferred defendants (i.e. those who have little
or nothing to be added to their sentences in line with the statutory maximum,
versus those who might be sentenced to death or retrial). The arbitrary classifica-
tion has no merit as there is no evidence whatever to suggest that those able tosuccessfully appeal their original conviction are more likely than others to havebeen the beneficiaries of excessively lenient sentences. In fact, it is argued that
this class should get preerred treatment instead of being discriminated againstbecause their appeals have been found meritorious, not frivolous. It is submitted
that either all sentences should be subject to reevaluation or none should be.
Patton v. North Carolina 381 F.2d 636, 642-45 (4th Cir. 1967); Whaley v.
North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); Hoigsberg, supra note 18, at
335; Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 637; Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1967).
20 Noperson shall be.. . deprived of life, liberty, or proprt without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV. The due process clause has been
held to guarantee fundamental fairness to all criminal defendants at trial. Thedefendant sometimes has to appeal and be retried to assure his right to an "error-
(Continued on next page)
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judge. Some require that the reasons appear in the record of the retrial
proceedings 22 while others do not impose this affirmative duty on the
judge.23 Some of the acceptable reasons are: more damaging evidence
at new trial, substantial change in the presentence report, different
judge did the resentencing, or defendant was convicted at retrial on
different charges. 2
4
The Court's opinion, delivered by Justice Stewart, dealt solely with
the constitutionality of Pearce's harsher sentence. It considered
whether he had been placed in double jeopardy, denied equal pro-
tection of the laws or deprived of liberty without due process of law.
Justice Stewart cursorily dismissed the double jeopardy issue. He
endorsed the Stroud v. United States25 corollary to United States v.
Ball26 and held that the double jeopardy clause does not restrict the
length of sentence upon reconviction.27 It seemed a simple matter for
the Court to say that because of Pearce's successful appeal, the first
conviction and consequent sentence were nullities and therefore, the
subsequent retrial procedure constituted a lawful single punishment.
This perfunctory acceptance of the waiver theory and "the unbroken
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
less" trial, but if he is deterred from appealing he cannot attain the fair trial which
the due process clause guarantees. The deterrent is the fear that he might re-
ceive a harsher sentence especially if the harsher sentence might be imposed
solely because the defendant chose to appeal. The "incredible dilemma" is em-
phasized when the choice to appeal would subject the defendant to the death
penalty. The defendant is confronted with the unhappy choice of either abandon-
ing his constitutional right to fair trial and serving out his original sentence, or
exercising that right under the hazard of having his sentence increased. Most
recent cases tend to prefer this argument over the double jeopardy theory. It
should be noted that the due process argument is closely related to the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine discussed in note 17, supra. It has been argued that
the due process clause prohibits harsher sentencing at retrial even though the
reversal of the first trial was not on constitutional grounds. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 439 (1963); Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 638-43 (4th Cir. 1967);
Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); Honigsberg, supra note
18, at 335, 341; Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 623-24; Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d
978 (1967).
21 United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967); Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1967); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
22 United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d P36 (2d Cir. 1968); Marano v. United
States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
23 See United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967); Starner v.
Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967).
24 United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 842-44 (2d Cir. 1968).
25 251 U.S. 14, 18 (1919).
26 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
2 7 Ball held that the double jeopardy prohibition was not against being twice
punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; therefore, a retrial for the same
offense did not put one in double jeopardy. Stroud extended Ball one step further
in upholding the constitutionality of an increased sentence upon retrial, empha-
sizing the fact that the defendant sought the reversal of the first trial.
[Vol. 58
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line of decisions that have followed [the Ball] principle"28 will surely
disappoint some legal scholars.2
9
Secondly, the Court held that the imposition of a more severe
sentence upon retrial does not violate the equal protection clause
since there is no "invidious classification" of those who are successful
in getting new trials. It is notable that the Court was not persuaded
by the invidious classification argument and its relevance to the equal
protection clause. The Court, instead of dwelling on the fact that
only the successful appellant is subject to having his sentence in-
creased, responded that the harsher sentence is not inevitable. The
"wholly new trial" can result in an acquittal, a lesser sentence, the
same sentence, or a greater one. 0 The Court argued, whatever the
result of the new trial, it is not the product of discrimination by in-
vidious classifications; but, it may depend "... upon a particular com-
bination of infinite variables peculiar to each individual trial.31 These
variables include: new evidence produced at the second trial, the de-
fendant's record while imprisoned on the first sentence and the pre-
sentencing investigation report. 2 Finally, the Court weakly countered
that if this were invidious discrimination, then successful appellants
are also in a preferred position since only they may be acquitted.
The Court based its affirmance on the fact that Pearce might have
been deprived of liberty without due process of law if vindictiveness
against him for having successfully attacked his first conviction
had played any part in rendering the sentence he received upon new
trial.33 It must be pointed out that there was no positive finding of
any flagrant or compelling denial of due process of law. The potential
in this case for resentencing abuse, however, was enough to hold that
due process of law required extra assurance against unconstitutional
deterrence of a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collater-
ally attack his first conviction.34 The possibility of such deplorable
judicial conduct would give rise to a legitimate fear that would serve
to deter the defendant's right to appeal. The Court said that due
process requires that:
28 395 U.S. at 721.
29 There is no tenable justification for the waiver theory. It impairs the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights instead of protecting and insuring them. Note, Con-
stitutional Law: Increased Sentence and Denial of Credit on Retrial Sustained
under Traditional Waiver Theory, 1965 DurE L.J. 395, 402 (1965).See also Van
Alstyne, supra note 11, at 610.
30 395 U.S. at 722.
31 Id. at 723.
32 Id. at 724-25.
33 Id. at 724.
34 Id. at 724.
1970]
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... objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the
part of the defendant occurring after the time of original sentenc-
ing proceeding... [a]nd the factual data upon which the sentence
is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional
legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on
appeal.35
Since the state gave no reason or justification for Pearce's increased
sentence "beyond the naked power to impose it,"36 the Court ruled that
vindictiveness, alien to due process of law, was a possible motive and
therefore, the second sentence was unconstitutional. It is important
to emphasize that the Court did not rule that the practice of harsher
resentencing upon reconviction is unconstitutional. The holding was
that harsher resentencing merely because the defendant appealed is
a violation of due process of law and must be affirmatively guarded
against.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions liberalizing the constitutional
protections available to the criminal defendant have been criticized
for opening the floodgates to appeals from criminal convictions. One
method of offsetting the potential for an unprecedented increase in ap-
peals would be to institute a harsher resentencing policy to deter such
appeals.37 The risk that a defendant who is successful in overturning
his first conviction may upon reconviction receive a harsher sentence
conceivably has this deterrent effect. In fact, resentencing can easily
be used for punishing the defendant for merely seeking his funda-
mental right to have a trial free from error. The main inquiry in
evaluating the Pearce decision is, does it guarantee the defendant the
right to "unfettered" exercise of his right to appeal?
The Court, in rejecting the double jeopardy and equal protection
arguments, did little more than cite the authorities which have pre-
viously adopted these arguments. Little time was spent analyzing the
merits of these propositions even though they had become law in
some federal and state jurisdictions.3 8 It is unfortunate that these con-
stitutional issues were not given more in-depth treatment. The Court,
however, basically agreed with the policy behind these arguments.
35 Id. at 726.
36 Id.
37 In the Brief for Petitioner in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).... [tlhe implication was that the Supreme Court need not be
troubled by a retroactive decision in Gideon's case, for many persons
held in prison under convictions obtained without benefit of defense
counsel would be deterred from seeking any relief from fear of even
harsher sentences upon retrial and conviction. Van Alstyne, supra note
11, at 607.
38 See note 9, supra.
[Vol. 58
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The opinion acknowledged the threat to a defendant's right to appeal
in order to secure the fundamental right of a fair trial. However, the
double jeopardy and the equal protection arguments require absolute
denial of any power to impose a harsher sentence on retrial, and the
Court declined to go this far, in view of the majority's belief that
there are some legitimate reasons for harsher sentencing on retrial.
The Court, therefore, used the due process argument to develop a
more flexible procedure which could eliminate any possibility of abuse
and still safeguard the power to resentence when necessary.39
Thus the Court sought to eliminate potential abuse, but still allow
justifiable harsher resentencing. This approach assumes two uncertain
facts: first, that any judicial abuse of the resentencing power will be
eliminated by requiring the judge to disclose his reason for the harsher
sentence; and second, that there are valid sentencing policies which
would outweigh the individual's interest in unfettered exercise of his
right to appeal.40
The Court, by its imposition of an affirmative duty on the sentencing
judge, apparently relies on an accountability system to prevent judicial
abuse. However, the duty is spelled out in broad terms, and given the
reluctance of appellate courts to overrule lower courts on questions
of fact, especially on questions of pure judicial discretion, abuse is
not impossible.41
The only valid reason for continuing to permit the imposition of a
harsher sentence on retrial is based on modem sentencing policies.42
Sentencing practices and policy in general are in great need of reform
and re-examination. The best way to insure that each criminal de-
fendant is treated fairly, both with respect to his own interest and
39 The danger of adopting an inflexible rule is that:
The court in which the successful appellant is being retried will be
unable to compensate for undue leniency which may have been shown
by the first sentencing judge or to adjust a sentence on the basis of a
rational evaluation of factors which were not available to the first judge.
Note, Retrial of the Successful Criminal Appellant: Harsher Punishment
and Denial of Credit for Time Served, 28 MD. L. RE-v. 64, 74 (1968).
40 See note 13, supra.
41This possibility for abuse is succinctly pointed out by the following example:
Thus even the compromise offered by Marano v. United States, and to
a lesser extent by United States v. White, is not satisfactory. For in
either case, an unsympathetic judge, given discretion in sentencing need
only refer to certain probation records or to alleged reports of ac-
cused's bad conduct during the period between the first and second sen-
tences to justify the upgrading of the second sentence. Honigsberg,-
supra note 18, at 342.
42 "... [Diespite contrary ipse dixits, the state may have an important in-
terest in the imposition of a sentence that appears just in light of the latest and
best information." United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836, 843 (2d Cir. 1968).
But see Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 616. The state's interest must be compell-
ing, not just important.
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society's, is to improve or change the initial sentencing mechanism so
its sentences are adequate.
The individual's right to appeal is most effectively protected by
imposing a ceiling on resentencing which would eliminate an undesir-
able aspect of retrial-the threat of greater punishment.43 The Court
in Pearce unfortunately chose not to protect absolutely the defendant's
right to appeal.
W. Stokes Harris, Jr.
CoNsTTuToNAL LAw-FEEDOm oF ExpssmoN-Symmormc Fam
SPExcH.-On June 6, 1966, a Brooklyn patrolman approached a crowd
of people standing around a black man burning a flag. The man,
Sidney Street, was telling them, "If they let that happen to Meredith,
we don't need an American flag." Street explained to the officer that
upon hearing the news that James Meredith had been shot, he set
fire to his flag. The policeman arrested Street and charged him with
"publicly mutilating the United States flag."' A New York court
convicted him of malicious mischief and gave him a suspended
sentence. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.
2
The Supreme Court of the United States noted jurisdiction.3 Held:
Reversed. It was possible that Street might have been convicted
not only for physically mutilating the flag, but also for defying it
with words, such words being constitutionally protected. Since the
New York statute did not separate the words from the act, the Supreme
Court declared the statute unconstitutional. Chief Justice Warren,
43 This ceiling could easily be imposed by statute. Indeed, Justice Black deems
this to be a legislative problem. 395 U.S. at 738. In most states, the permissibil-
ity of harsher resentencing of successful appellants is strictly a judicial creation
without statutory support. Two states, California and Virginia, forbid harsher
resentencing as does the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 863 (b)
(1964). The American Bar Associations Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice has a draft which reads:
Where prosecution is initiated or resumed against a defendant who has
successfully sought post conviction relief and a conviction is obtained,
or where a sentence has been set aside as the result of a successful ap-
plication for post conviction relief and the defendant is to be resentenced,
the sentencing court should not be empowered to impose a more severe
penalty than that originally imposed. ABA STANDARDs BELATING TO POST
CoNVIrcION REMMIES 96 (1967).
1"Any person who... shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample
on, or cast contempt upon either by word or act [any flag] shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 1425(16) (b) (McKinney 1944).
In 1967, this statute was superceded by § 126 of the N.Y. GENERAL BusINEss
LAw which defines the crime in similar language.
2 People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967).
8 Street v. City of New York, 392 U.S. 923 (1968).
[Vol. 58
